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A Change in Macroeconomic Thinking 
Andrew Beath 
Thomas Kuhn, in his seminal work 
entitled "The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions," notes that when the 
progression of reality transcends and 
otherwise appears incompatible with the 
paradigms devised to explain such events, 
new venues of thought will be proposed. If 
these newly proposed paradigms are 
popularly perceived to explain the 
happenings under consideration better than 
those in existence, they will eventually 
I displace them, becoming the accepted tool of 
analysis. The 1930s was such a period. A 
severe economic depression debiitated much 
of the industrialized world, adversely 
affecting nearly every economic indicator 
measured, most notably leaving 
unemployment levels at historically high 
levels. Accepted classical notions of supply 
and demand and the abiity of markets to 
clear apparently were describing the 
sconomic operations in some mystical 
utopia. Adam Smith's "invisible hand" for 
equilibrating the markets of the modem 
economy had never been so invisible. As 
was evident, there were grave deficiencies 
- S  between the accepted economic paradigms of the classical school and events in the real 
world. At about this time, a talented and 
1 vocal economic philosopher by the name of 
John Maynard Keynes, son of the notable 
economist John Neville Keynes, was 
I enjoying the heyday of his professional career. When the dust had settled, the 
I institution of modem political economy for the next thirty years had been revolutionized. John Maynard Keynes' most notable 
m :-; disagreement with the classical school 
occurred over what was perhaps the most 
conspicuous economic problem of the time-- 
I -'-' employment, or lack thereof The classical 
economists had essentially taken Say's Law 
(the notion that supply creates its own 
demand) as the standard by which they 
performed their macroeconomic analysis. 
The classical school believed that the 
economy must automatically adjust to a 
position of fUll employment, and that at this 
position the interest rate would ensure that 
aggregate savings equaled aggregate 
investment. Savings, the classicists argued, 
was positively related to the interest rate by 
encouraging people to forsake current 
consumption for a greater amount of future 
consumption. Investment is negatively 
related to the interest rate as it alters the 
opportunity cost to firms of investment at the 
margin. If investment increases, the interest 
rate would rise, causing people to transfer a 
portion of the income fiom consumption into 
savings. Thus, as the loanable hnds market 
ensured a ready demand for goods and 
services by balancing investment and 
consumption, fke markets and rapid interest 
rate responses more or less guaranteed fill 
employment. 
Keynes protested the fkciie naivetC of the 
classical model of savings and investment 
determination, showing that investors' 
"animal spirits" and their desire for short- 
term gain cause investment decisions to 
revolve around "anticipating what average 
opinion expects the average rate to be," far 
adrift of even any recognition of interest rate 
levels. Keynes also believed that 
consumption and saving are functions of 
aggregate income, rather than the real 
interest rate as the classical school had 
contended. Thus, he asserted that a rise in 
the interest rate will cause no change in 
consumption and savings. With this new 
model dependent upon the income level, 
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Keynes saw no guarantee that savings and 
investment would necessarily be equal at a 
level of economic activity that p~oduced full 
employment. Keynes showed that after a 
given level of income, the aggregate supply 
of goods and services begins to outstrip 
aggregate demand, which includes both the 
demand for consumption and investment 
goods and services. In other words, the 
aggregate cost of producing that higher level 
of output would exceed the receipts 
obtainable from consumption and investment 
expenditures at that level. In such a case, 
unsold inventories would build up, forcing 
entrepreneurs to cut back production to the 
level at which aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply were equal. Thus, 
although the output level generated by 
consumption and investment is stable, it is 
not necessarily the full-employment level of 
national output. 
"Left to its own devices, 
Keynes felt that there was no 
way a free market system, 
even with downwardly 
flexible wages and prices, 
could guarantee full 
employment." 
In addition to the self-regulating 
mechanism of responsive interest rates within 
the loanable funds market, the classical 
school relied upon flexible wages and prices 
to equilibrate the goods market. Given low 
aggregate demand as a result ot: for instance, 
a sluggish loanable funds market, money, 
wages and prices would fail to ensure the 
economy returned to its position of full 
employment and full production. For 
example, if the real wage were at a level 
which resulted in unemployment, 
unemployed workers would competitively 
bid the real wage down to a level which 
facilitated full employment. Classicists saw 
no need to question the willingness of 
workers to accept lower wages or 
entrepreneurs to automatically lower their 
prices in order to allow the economy to 
return to its optimal position. 
Keynes, however, did. He argued that 
laborers supplied labor with respect to the 
nominal wage, and thus lived under a 
"money illusion," which impelled them to 
refuse to take cuts in their nominal wages. 
Long-term labor contracts also served the 
purpose of precluding cuts in nominal wages. 
As a consequence, structural or involuntary 
unemployment would become the norm 
following a reduction in aggregate demand. 
Firms faced with lower revenues would be 
unable to reduce costs by lowering wage 
rates, leading either to layoffs or a distinct 
absence of new employees. Since there is no 
tendency for the employment rate to shift 
from this point, equilibrium in. the labor 
market would be established at a level below 
full employment. In fact, equilibrium could 
be established at any utilization of labor, not 
just at the level of full employment as 
classicists had contended. Keynes reinforced 
his argument against the classicists' 
conviction that the wage-price adjustment 
mechanism would ensure full employment by 
showing that even if workers willingly 
accepted a diminution of their wages, the 
wage-price adjustment mechanism would 
still be incapable of effecting full 
employment. Because a firm's profit margin 
is determined by prices and wages, the 
employment capabilities of finns are 
dependent on the real wage. It is this that 
must decrease if full employment is to be 
achieved. Due to the fact that widespread 
wage reductions would lower aggregate 
demand, Keynes argued via the classicistst 
own wage-price adjustment mechanism--as 
lower aggregate demand translates into 
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excess supply of goods and services, wage 
reductions must precipitate a commensurate 
fall in prices. And as a price fall would 
accom~any the wage cut, real wages would 
remain constant, leaving employment levels 
unchanged. 
Left to its own devices, Keynes felt that 
there was no way a fke market system, even 
with downwardlj flexible wages-and prices, 
could guarantee fill employment. In fact, 
Keynes showed that an exogenous reduction 
in aggregate demand would cause 
production and employment levels to 
stabilize below their optimal levels. This 
unemployment and underproduction could 
be relieved by increasing aggregate demand, 
; or one of its components (consumption or 
investment) by the Merence between the 
[ levels of aggregate supply and denyind at M 
production. As alluded to earlier, Keynes 
viewed private investment decisions with a 
heavy dose of skepticism, believing they 
were volatile, motivated by capricious 
psychological factors and desire for short- 
term financial gain, more or less making 
them analogous to the decisions made by 
gamblers in a casino. As a result, Keynes 
didn't hold much hope that private 
investment finds would p&de the s&nulus 
Y of aggregate demand. Keynes also rejected the somewhat 
popular tool of monetary policy, believing it 
was unable to affect the increase in 
aggregate demand necessary to restore hll 
employment levels and, in turn, rejecting the 
accompanying conclusions drawn by 
neoclassicists fiom their quantity theory of 
money. Neoclassicists argued that the 
money supply could be adjusted to produce 
changes when there are unemployed 
resources in the economy. Keynes, however, 
disagreed over one apparently minor but 
ultimately critical point; he felt that in 
addition to transactions and precautionary 1 purposes, individuals hold money in order to 
speculate in the bond market. When interest 
rates are high, individuals prefer to hold 
bonds, but as the interest rate falls bond 
prices rise, rendering the holding of bonds 
less and less attractive and the selling of 
them more and more attractive. Thus, as the 
interest rate falls, more and more people 
choose to hold their assets in the form of 
money. Keynesians argue that the interest 
rate may eventually fall to so low a positive 
level as to encourage everybody to hold the 
more liquid asset of money instead of the 
now unsafe bonds for speculative purposes. 
According to Keynes, this renders monetary 
policy completely ineffective in the fhce of 
depression or unemployment since changes 
in the money supply cannot alter the interest 
rates which are used to influence spending, 
income and employment. 
Keynes, therefore, felt that a strong fiscal 
policy--as opposed to sole reliance on 
monetary policy--was the only reliable means 
to achieve economic stabilization. Keynes 
argued that the government should use its 
powers to tax and spend in order to influence 
the business cycle by providing direct 
injections of public investment into the 
income stream. As investment expenditures 
affect income not by the amount of the 
spending change, but by some multiple 
determined by the marginal propensity to 
consume, spending increases will result in 
manifold rises in the level of production. 
Such spending increases could be financed 
by tax increases (although this would reduce 
consumption, the multiplicative effects of an 
increase in government spending outweigh 
those of a tax increase, so the overall effect 
on the economy would be positive), by the 
sale of bonds to the Federal Reserve or by 
some other means. Keynes looked for a MI- 
scale program of discretionary fiscal policy 
and the strengthening of built-in 
macroeconomic stabilizers such as 
progressive taxation. 
Within a few years, these notions had 
permeated virtually every economic 
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institution in the Western world, from the 
offices of economic advisers and policy 
makers to the classrooms of institutions of 
higher learning. This led to the inaction of 
higher marginal tax rates, burgeoning 
expenditure programs, welfare benefits and 
public work projects, and ultimately 
bequeathing a bitter legacy of astronomical 
debt to future the power brokers of nations 
who adopted the Keynesian model. For 
three decades, from the conclusion of the 
second World War to the oil crises of the 
1970s, Keynesian notions formed much of 
the basis for governmental intervention in the 
economy. Macroeconomics would never be 
the same. 
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